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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic theory argues that the liberalization of trade promotes efficiency, 
scale economies, competition, factor productivity and trade flows, thereby, 
promoting economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Wacziarg, 
1997).  Despite liberal trade reforms in many countries, researchers have 
identified variety of country-specific barriers, which impede the growth of 
world trade (Kalirajan, 1999).  These constraints would create a ―trade-gap‖ 
by reducing actual trade flows between countries from their potential levels 
(Kalirajan, 2007).  It is in this context, besides multilateral efforts, regional 
and bilateral efforts facilitate countries to address some of these barriers.  
Doha Round of WTO was conceptualized for removing the trade 
distortions in international trading regime for the development oriented trade 
integration of developing countries (Ahmed, 2008).  Given the slow progress 
of Doha Round in the WTO, both developed and developing countries have 
moved towards regionalism or bilateralism to cater to their growth and 
developmental needs.  As a result, the number of regional trading agreements 
(RTAs) has proliferated in alarming way.  Up to February 2010, 462 RTAs 
have been notified to the GATT/WTO; 345 RTAs were notified under 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 31 under the Enabling 
Clause; and 86 under Article V of the GATS.  Of these RTAs, Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for 90%, while 
customs unions account for 10 % (WTO, 2010).   
In recent times, India has also witnessed an increasing emphasis on India‘s 
economic partnership arrangements with various countries and regions.  
Some of which are in the immediate neighbourhood and some are in the 
inter-regional framework of economic cooperation.  The interactions have 
ranged from bilateralism to sub-regionalism to regionalism.  Some of the 
initiatives that are in the process of being studied, negotiated and 
implemented include India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA), India-ASEAN FTA, India-Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IKCEPA), India-Japan 
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IJCEPA), India-China 
Economic Cooperation, India-GCC economic cooperation, India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) Initiative, India-Mauritius and India-Egypt Economic 
Partnership, India-EU Economic Cooperation, India-US FTA, India-
Australia FTA, etc. 
A major highlight of the recent attempts at economic cooperation 
initiatives is in terms of broadening of scope and emphasis ranging from 
trade to investment and services.  India is now focusing on non-tariff barriers 
along with tariffs as well as on services along with goods.  Investment 
cooperation has also emerged as an area of priority.  In addition, intensive 
work is being done on issues like the rules of origin, mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs), anti-dumping provisions, revenue compensation 
mechanism, safeguards like sensitive or negative lists, time schedule for tariff 
elimination/concession, dispute settlement modalities, etc.  In short, in the 
present-day agreements, India has placed considerable emphasis on making 
them as comprehensive as possible. 
India, the second largest in the world after China in terms of population, is 
one of the fastest growing markets in the world.  Its economic growth 
averages around 8% and its gross domestic product amounts to $3.3 trillion 
in terms of purchasing power, fourth in the world after the U.S., China and 
Japan.   In the recent years, Indian economy has not only enhanced market 
access for Korean goods but has also provided investment opportunities for 
internationally competitive Korean companies.  South Korea is classified as a 
high-income economy, Asia‘s fourth largest economy and having a very high 
HDI, measuring particularly high in the Education Index, where it is ranked 
first in Asia and seventh worldwide.  South Korea is currently ranked as the 
most innovative country in the world among major economies in the Global 
Innovation Index.  Despite immense potential to enhance economic co-
operation between the two sides, the current size of trade and investment is 
very low compared to the size and structural complementarities of the two 
economies because of several tariff and non-tariff barriers in both economies.  
In this context, the signing of India-Korea CEPA has been welcomed and 
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rightly so, by both the business community and policy makers from both the 
countries.  This agreement which has provisions for substantial reduction of 
both tariffs and non-tariff barriers in a phased manner is expected to take 
India-Korea relations to a higher level and enhance India‘s presence in East 
Asia.  
Despite widely acclaimed significance of India-Korea trade and 
investment relations; there is a dearth of empirical research work on India-
Korea economic relations in general.  To the best of my knowledge, there is 
no empirical research work based on scientific methodologies on probable 
impacts of India-Korea CEPA.  The present study has made an attempt to 
examine economic benefits that India and Korea can derive from the 
establishment of an FTA and to compare various hypothetical tariff 
liberalization scenarios on certain key variables, such as prices, welfare, 
employment, imports and exports using GTAP and SMART model.  In 
addition, this paper has also made an attempt to identify untapped investment 
opportunities in various sectors in India.  Thus, the present study will add to 
the existing literature on these issues. 
In this context, the main objectives of this paper are (i) to simulate the 
gains and losses in terms of trade and investment due to recently signed 
India-Korea CEPA and (ii) to suggest policy conclusions that can be drawn 
as inputs into the policymaking process for furthering the mutual interest of 
both countries.  The remainder paper is arranged as follows: section 2 
provides the review of selected literature.  Section 3 briefly discusses the 
India-Korea CEPA and its objectives.  Section 4 reviews bilateral trade 
relations between India and South Korea.  Section 5 discusses research 
methodology and data bases.  Section 6 presents various simulation scenarios.  
Section 7 reports and discusses the GTAP and SMART results while section 
8 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. REVIEW OF THE SELECTED LITERATURE 
 
There have been intense theoretical expositions by trade theorists on the 
likely impact of regionalism and bilateralism on the international trade flows 
of commodities.  The earliest work on the theory of regional integration was 
presented by Viner (1950) in his seminal work ‗The customs union issue‘ 
where he used two concepts namely ‗trade creation‘ and ‗trade diversion‘ to 
explain the economic outcome of the regional integration and demonstrated 
that ‗trade diversion‘ is harmful to world trade.  Subsequently Meade (1955), 
Vanek (1965), Ohyama (1972) and Kemp and Wan (1976) made substantial 
improvements in the theory of regional integration.  Economic theory 
suggests that the most desirable trading bloc is one that is the most trade-
creating, and that bloc is global.  Such a bloc comprises countries with the 
most diverse range of comparative advantage, which affords the greatest 
scope for trade creation and the least scope for trade diversion (Schott, 1991).  
The case for a global trading bloc (i.e. global free trade) is a result of 
standard trade theory which may partly be materialized if free, transparent 
and non distorting trade flows of goods and services take place under WTO 
rule based regime.  Due to slow movement in WTO rule based regime, the 
widespread of RTAs/FTAs has led to the debate whether they help or hinder 
the broader process of multilateral trade liberalization.  Are they, in 
Bhagwati‘s (1993) phrase, ―building blocks‖ or ―stumbling blocks‖ on the 
road to global free trade? Researchers like Oye (1992), Kahler (1995), Ethier 
(1998), Lazer (1999), Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) and Sampson and 
Woolcock (2003) state that regionalism isn‘t blocking multilateralism; 
instead it is assisting its development while Richardson (1994), Winters 
(1996), Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998) say that regionalism can hinder the 
move to multilateralism.  It is still unresolved theoretically and empirically 
whether RTAs facilitates or hinders multilateralism in trade. 
Another important dimension of RTAs is the flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) among RTAs/FTAs partners.  Linkage between trade and 
FDI has now been established in theoretical as well as empirical literature.   
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Following Mundell (1957), it was long thought that FDI substitutes trade.  
The proposition was challenged by Agmon (1979), and subsequently a 
number of studies emphasised potential complementarities between FDI and 
trade.  This literature has been reviewed by Ethier (1994, 1996, and 1998) 
and Markusen (1995 and 1998).  Ethier (1998) has shown that membership in 
RTAs can provide small but crucial competitive advantages to countries that 
can help them attract large FDI inflows.  Preferential treatment for RTA 
members can generate not only the well known ‗trade creation‘ and ‗trade 
diversion‘ effects, but also ‗investment creation‘ and ‗investment diversion‘ 
effects.  The empirical literature corroborates the above arguments. 
Chakrabarti (2001) argues that after market size, openness to trade has been 
the most reliable indicator of the attractiveness of a location for FDI.  Studies 
that examine the impact of openness to trade and regional agreements for 
trade on FDI inflows and find them to be important determinants are 
Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashmova (1998), Taylor (2000), Chakrabarti (2001) 
and Asiedu (2002). 
Many empirical studies have tried to study the impact of FTAs on intra-
regional and extra-regional FDI.  Yeyati et al. (2003) find that regional 
integration on the whole contributes to attracting FDI.  A study by Velde and 
Bezemer (2006) on the other hand, established that the impact on FDI would 
be different for different types of regions and the position of countries within 
a region would be pivotal for attracting FDI.  UNCTAD (2006) shows that 
the EU has increased its share in global FDI inflows following the formation 
of the single market from nearly 30% in 1980s to about 50% in 1990s and 
has stayed there.  Globerman and Shapiro (1999) find that Canada-US free 
trade agreement (CUFTA) and North American free trade agreement 
(NAFTA) increased both inward and outward FDI.  In the context of Korea-
US FTA, Kang and Park (2004) found that FTA increased FDI by 14-35% 
from member countries and by 28-35% from non-member countries.  Baltagi 
et al. (2007) conducted a study on bilateral outward FDI stocks into Europe 
over 1989-2001 and found that an RTA increases FDI up to 78% among 
European countries.  
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3. CEPA AND ITS OBJECTIVE 
 
Recognising their long-standing friendship, strong economic ties and close 
cultural links, the benefits of a CEPA between India and Korea were 
examined by Joint Study Group (JSG) in January 2005.  The 
recommendations of JSG served as the framework for negotiations on the 
CEPA and its structure as an integrated package of agreements.  The CEPA, 
which came into effect in 2010, has provisions for substantial cuts in both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers.  These will be implemented in a phased manner.  
Tariffs would be reduced or eliminated on 93% of Korea‘s tariff lines and 
85% of India‘s tariff lines.  The details are provided in Appendix.  
The CEPA would improve their attractiveness to capital and human 
resources, and create larger and new markets, to expand trade and investment 
not only between them but also in the region.  The objectives of this 
Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules 
are to: 
 
i) liberalise and facilitate trade in goods and services and expand 
investment between the Parties; 
ii) establish a cooperative framework for strengthening and enhancing the 
economic relations between the Parties; 
iii) establish a framework conducive for a more favourable environment 
for their businesses and promote conditions of fair competition in the 
free trade area;  
iv) establish a framework of transparent rules to govern trade and 
investment between the Parties; 
v) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of 
this Agreement; 
vi) explore new areas of economic cooperation and develop appropriate 
measures for closer economic partnership between the Parties; 
vii) improve the efficiency and competitiveness of their manufacturing and 
services sectors and expand trade and investment between the Parties; and 
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viii) establish a framework for further regional and multilateral cooperation 
to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement throughout Asia, 
and thereby, to encourage the economic integration of Asian economies. 
 
 
4. INDIA-KOREA TRADE 
 
The increase in bilateral trade in goods between the two countries has been 
attributed to changing demand structure and comparative advantages of both 
the economies in complementary sectors.  The Indian export basket has 
traditionally consisted of low value added products which shifted over time 
to a wider range of industrial products in recent years while the Indian import 
basket from Korea in recent years has mainly consisted of relatively high 
value added products such as electrical machinery and equipments, nuclear 
reactors, iron and steel, transport equipments, mineral fuels and their 
products, organic chemicals, etc.  As far as bilateral trade in services is 
concerned, it has consistently increased in some sectors such as IT/Software 
and travel services.  It is important to highlight that India is the 9th largest 
exporter of commercial services and Korea is the 11th largest importer of 
commercial services.  The CEPA agreement which gives market access and 
allows inflows of professionals such as IT workers, engineers, and teachers 
would be beneficial for India and improve bilateral trade in services. 
During 1991-2008, India‘s total merchandise trade with South Korea has 
increased at double digit except few years.  Total bilateral trade has increased 
28 times during this period.  It increased from US$ 0.56 billion in 2001 to 
US$ 15.8 billion in 2008.  The share of South Korea in India‘s exports lies in 
the range of 1% to 3% and imports lies in the range of 1.6% to 3.2% during 
1991-2008.  The share of India in South Korea‘s exports lies in the range of 
0.65% to 2.10% and imports lies in the range of 0.59% to 1.51% during 
1991-2008.  Despite increase in trade, it can be seen that the trade intensity 
for the India has been below optimum while reverse is true for South Korea.  
The value of trade intensity index for India indicates that the extent of trade 
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between the economies is low than would be expected on the basis of their 
importance in world trade.  Table A1 in Appendix reveals that trade and 
export Intensity Index of India (TII) with South Korea is less than 1 and 
remained so since 1991, except 2008 while TII of South Korea with India is 
more than 1.  TII indicates that India‘s trade flow is smaller than expected, 
given the partner country‘s importance in world trade.  This means India‘s 
exports and imports are not intense with South Korea compared with its 
trading pattern with rest of the world (see for details, table 1 and 2 in 
appendix).   
Figure 1 represents Indian imports from South Korea.  It shows that India 
was importing approximately US$ 0.82 billion in 2000 which has increased 
to US$ 8.35 billion in 2008.  During this period, Indian tariff rate on imports 
from South Korea has reduced substantially as well (figure 2).  India‘s 
imports from South Korea are concentrated in HS chapter 84, 85, 72, 27, 87, 
39, 73, 29, 40 and 48 and include commodities like — nuclear reactors, 
boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof (15.60%), 
electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof (15.34%), Iron and 
steel (13.84%), mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral waxes, etc (9.11%), vehicles o/t railw/tramw 
roll-stock (9.10%), plastics and Articles thereof, articles of iron or steel, 
organic chemicals, rubber and articles thereof, paper & paperboard; art of 
paper, rubber and articles thereof, etc. (figure 3).  These products account 
81.79% of India‘s imports from South Korea.   
It is important to highlight that most of the India‘s import items are 
concentrated in low tariff HS chapters.  Figure 4 indicate first 10 HS chapters 
on the basis of Indian weighted and simple import tariff on Korean products 
in descending order.  The tariff rate lies in the range of 88% to 30%.  If we 
analyze the figure 3 and figure 4 simultaneously, none of the HS chapter is 
common in the list. It implies that South Korean firms have not penetrated 
Indian market in high tariff products.  Hence, it may be inferred that tariffs 
act as significant trade barrier. 
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Figure 1 Indian Imports from South Korea (%) 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
 
Figure 2 Indian Tariff Rates on Imports from South Korea 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
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Figure 3 Indian Imports from South Korea (% in 2008) 
(HS Chapter in Descending Order) 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
 
Figure 4 Indian Tariff Rates on Imports from South Korea  
                             (% in 2008), (HS Chapter in Descending Order) 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
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Figure 5 South Korean Imports from India 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
 
Figure 5 represents South Korea‘s imports from India.  It shows that South 
Korea was importing approximately US$ 0.98 billion in 2000 which has 
increased to US$ 6.58 billion in 2008.  During this period, South Korean 
tariff rate on imports from India has declined as well (figure 6).  South 
Korea‘s imports from India are concentrated in HS chapter 27, 72, 23, 29, 52, 
84, 26, 85, 71, and 10 (figure 7).  It is important to highlight that HS Chapter 
27, i.e., mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral waxes, account 60% of South Korea‘s 
imports from India.  The products in Chapter 27 faces very low or zero tariff 
in South Korean Market.  It highlights that India exports to South Korea are 
not diversified.   
South Korea‘s imports from India are also concentrated in low tariff HS 
chapters.  Figure 8 indicate first 10 HS chapters on the basis of South 
Korea‘s weighted and simple import tariff on Indian products in descending 
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Figure 6 South Korea’s Tariff Rates on Imports from India 
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
 
Figure 7 South Korea’s Imports from India (% in 2008) 
(HS Chapter in Descending Order)  
Source: WITS Database (2010). 
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Figure 8 South Korea’s Tariff on Imports from India in 2008 (%) 
(HS Chapter in Descending Order) 
Source: WITS database (2010). 
 
order.   The tariff rate lies in the range of 2% to 428%.  Analyzing the figure 
7 and figure 8 simultaneously, it seems that Indian exports has not penetrated 
or marginally in high tariff HS chapters.  Hence, it may be inferred that 
tariffs act as significant trade barrier. 
 
 
5. METHODOLOGY AND DATABASES 
 
The quantitative analyses in this paper are based on the SMART and 
GTAP model.  SMART is a computable partial equilibrium (CPE) model 
while GTAP is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  Both 
models are widely used for trade policy analysis.  Both models feature their 
own advantages and disadvantages.  
SMART model is a partial equilibrium modeling framework developed by 
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World Bank/UNCTAD.  The main advantage of the partial equilibrium 
approach to Market Access Analysis is its minimal data requirement.  In fact, 
the only required data for the trade flows, the trade policy (tariff), and a 
couple of behavioral parameters (elasticities).  This can therefore take 
advantage of the rich WITS datasets which contain all of those.  Another 
advantage (which follows directly from the minimal data requirement) is that 
it permits an analysis at a fairly disaggregated (or detailed) level.  This also 
resolves a number of ―aggregation biases‖. 
However, the partial equilibrium approach has a number of disadvantages 
that have to be kept in mind while conducting any analysis.  For instance, the 
partial equilibrium models may miss important interactions and feedbacks 
between various markets.  In particular, the partial equilibrium approach 
tends to neglect the important inter-sectoral input/output (or 
upstream/downstream) linkages that are the basis of general equilibrium 
analyses.  It also misses the existing constraints that apply to the various 
factors of production (e.g., labor, capital, land…) and their movement across 
sectors. 
The general equilibrium methodology provides an analytical framework 
that allows these inter- and intra-sectoral changes in output mix and by 
extension the demand for different factors of production to be captured.  
GTAP is a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
designed for comparative-static analysis of trade policy issues (Adams et al., 
1998). 
 
5.1. Theoretical Framework of SMART Model 
 
The setup of SMART is that, for a given good, different countries compete 
to supply (export to) a given home market.  The focus of the simulation 
exercise is on the composition and volume of imports into that market.  The 
degree of responsiveness of the supply of export to changes in the export 
price is given by the export supply elasticity.  SMART assumes infinite 
export supply elasticity — that is, the export supply curves are flat and the 
Shahid Ahmed 60 
world prices of each variety are exogenously given.  This is often called the 
price taker assumption.  
SMART relies on the Armington assumption to model the behavior of the 
consumer.  In particular, the adopted modeling approach is based on the 
assumption of imperfect substitutions between different import sources 
(different varieties).  That is, goods (defined at the HS 6 digit level) imported 
from different countries, although similar, are imperfect substitutes.  
Within the Armington assumption, the representative agent maximizes its 
welfare through a two-stage optimization process: 
 
 First, given a general price index, she chooses the level of total 
spending/consumption on a ―composite good‖.  The relationship 
between changes in the price index and the impact on total spending is 
determined by a given import demand elasticity. 
 Then, within this composite good, she allocates the chosen level of 
spending among the different ―varieties‖ of the good, depending on the 
relative price of each variety.  The extent of the between-variety 
allocative response to change in the relative price is determined by the 
Armington substitution elasticity. 
 
The SMART model incorporates three kinds of elasticities:  
 
 Supply Elasticity: Supply elasticity is the export supply elasticity 
value.  By default, SMART uses 99 for infinite elasticity for all 
products and partners.  This means that an increase in demand for a 
given good will always be matched by the producers and exporters of 
that good, without any impact on the price of the good. 
 Substitution Elasticity: Import substitution elasticities record the rate 
of substitution between two goods from different origins.  The 
Armington assumption is incorporated, meaning that similar goods 
from different countries are imperfectly substitutable.  The import 
substitution elasticity is considered to be 1.5 for each good.  
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 Import Demand Elasticity: Import demand elasticity measures the 
demand response to a shift in import price.  Default values are the same 
for all reporters but may vary by product.  
 
Another important assumption made by the model is perfect competition, 
which means for example that tariff cuts are fully reflected in the prices paid 
by consumers (see for details Jammes and Olarreaga, 2005). 
 
5.2. Theoretical Framework of GTAP Model 
 
GTAP model captures in two types of equations, namely behavioural 
equations and accounting relationships.  The key drivers of the model are the 
behavioural equations, which are based on microeconomic theory.  
Accordingly there are behavioural equations for the consumers, producers 
and also for the international trade (exports and imports).  These equations 
capture the behaviour of the optimizing agents such as the consumers that 
allows the derivation of the demand functions.  The second type of the 
equations is the accounting relationships.  These are essential in order to 
ensure that the behavioural equations solution occurs within a consistent 
macroeconomic framework.  Thus, the accounting relationships ensure that 
the receipts and the expenditures of all the agents (consumers, producers, 
government, rest-of-the-world) are balanced.  Hertel (1997) covers in details 
the theory behind the model and the derivations of the behavioural 
equations
1)
 and available on the Internet (http://www.agecon.purdue. 
edu/gtap).  For the purposes of this study, these derivations are taken as given 
and the study simply provides just the broad outline of what the GTAP model 
is like. 
Figure 9 has been reproduced from Brockmeier (2001) to explain the 
accounting relationships in multi region open economy as captured by GTAP 
model.  The starting point is a regional household associated with each country 
                                                          
1) Chapter 2 of what has come to be popularly known as the GTAP Book covers the economic 
theory of the GTAP model. 
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Figure 9 Multi Region Open Economy 
Source: Brockmeier (2001). 
 
or composite region2) of GTAP.  This regional household collects all income 
that is generated in the closed economy.  According to a Cobb Douglas, per 
capita utility function, regional income is exhausted over the three forms of 
final demand: Private household Expenditures (PRIVEXP), Government 
Expenditures (GOVEXP) and savings (SAVE).  The first component of final 
demand is private consumption (Value of Domestic Private household 
                                                          
2) A composite region is an aggregation of different countries whose individual disaggregation 
has not be done in the GTAP database e.g., rest of sub-Sahara Africa is an aggregation of all 
African countries that are not available in the database as stand-alones. 
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purchases, evaluated at Agents‘ prices, VDPA).  The constrained optimizing 
behavior of private consumption is represented in GTAP by the CDE 
(Constant Difference of Elasticity) implicit expenditure function.  The second 
component of final demand is Government purchases (Value of Domestic 
Government purchases, evaluated at Agents‘ prices, VDGA).  In order to 
model the behavior of government spending, a Cobb Douglas sub-utility 
function is employed in GTAP.  In this case the Cobb Douglas expenditure 
shares are constant across all commodities.  Considering the third component 
of final demand, savings are completely exhausted on investment (NETINV).  
Regional income consists of the Value of Output at Agent‘s prices (VOA) 
paid by producers for the use of endowment commodities to the regional 
household.  At the same time, the producers receive payments for selling 
consumption goods to the private households (VDPA) and the government 
(VDGA), intermediate inputs to other producers (Value of Domestic Firm 
Purchases, evaluated at Agents‘ prices, VDFA) and investment goods to the 
savings sector (NETINV).  Under the zero profit assumption employed in 
GTAP, these revenues must be precisely exhausted on expenditures for 
intermediate inputs (VDFA) and primary factors of production (VOA).  
TAXES flow from the private household, firms and government to the 
regional household.  Since these value flows include both taxes and subsidies, 
they denote net tax revenues.  
Looking at the multi region open economy, accounting relations are 
redefined.  Firms get additional revenues for selling commodities to the Rest 
of the World on the one side.  These exports are denoted by VXMD.  On the 
other side, the producers now spend their revenues not only on primary 
factors and domestically produced intermediate inputs, but also on imported 
intermediate inputs, VIFA.  Furthermore, the firms have to pay an additional 
consumption tax on imported inputs to the regional household.  Since this tax 
expenditure is included in the TAXES flowing from the producer to regional 
household, the figure 9 does not show any change in this respect.  The 
government and private households not only spend their income on 
domestically produced but also on imported commodities which are denoted 
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as VIPA and VIGA, respectively.  Finally, we have to check the accounting 
relationships for the rest of the world.  According to the figure 9, the rest of 
the world gets payments for selling their goods for private consumption, 
government, and firms.  These revenues will be spent on commodities 
exported from the single region to the rest of the world, denoted as VXMD, 
and on import taxes, MTAX, and export taxes, XTAX paid to the regional 
household.  This is simplified exposition of multi region open economy in 
GTAP model.  However, readers are advised to refer to Brockmeier (2001) 
for details. 
Each regional sector is assumed to choose a mixture of inputs to minimise 
total cost for a given level of output.  In the derivation of factor inputs 
demands, the model structure uses constant returns to scale technology and 
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions with 
three levels.  At the first level, producers use composite units of intermediate 
inputs and primary factors in fixed proportions according to a Leontief 
function.  At the second level of the production nest, intermediate input 
composites are obtained as combinations of imported bundles and domestic 
goods of the same input-output class, and primary factor input composites are 
created as combinations of skilled-labour, unskilled-labour, capital, land, and 
natural resources.  A CES function is used in forming both types of 
composites.  Finally at the third level, imported bundles are created via a 
CES aggregation of imported goods of the same class from each region.  
Figure 10 provides a visual display of the assumed technology for firms in 
each of the industries in the GTAP model.  This kind of a production ―tree‖ is 
a convenient way of representing separable, constant returns-to-scale 
technologies.  For example, the primary factors of production are: land, 
labour, and capital.  Their quantities are denoted QFE(i, j, s), or, in percentage 
change form, qfe(i, j, s).  The quantities in brackets [.] in figure 10 refer to 
rates of technical change.  Firms also purchase intermediate inputs, some of 
which are produced domestically, qfd(i, j, s), and some of which are 
imported, qfm(i, j, s).  In the case of imports, the intermediate inputs must be 
―sourced‖ from particular exporters, qxs(i, r, s).  The equations describing the 
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Figure 10 Production Structure 
Source: Hertel (1997). 
 
firm behavior portrayed in figure 10 are provided in Hertel (1997).  
On the demand side, the GTAP model adopts a sophisticated specification 
of consumer behaviour which allows for differences in both price and income 
responsiveness of demand in different regions, depending on the level of 
development and regional specific demand patterns.  Each region or 
composite
 
region in GTAP has a single representative household that collects 
all the regional income.  This regional household receives all the income 
generated through payments to primary factors, and net tax revenue.  Its 
behaviour is governed by an aggregate utility function over private household 
consumption, government consumption, and savings.  The aggregate utility is 
modeled by a Cobb-Douglas function with constant expenditure shares.  The 
government consumption is also described by a Cobb-Douglas function over 
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composite commodities where the demand for the latter is a CES aggregation 
of imports and domestic goods.  Private household consumption is explained 
by a CDE (Constant Difference of Elasticities) expenditure function.  These 
households purchase bundles of commodities where the bundles are CES 
aggregation of domestic goods and imported bundles.  The imported bundles 
in turn are formed by a CES aggregation of imports from different regions.  
Regional governments intervene in their own markets by imposing taxes 
and subsidies on commodities and primary factors, thus driving wedges 
between prices paid by purchasers and prices received by producers.  These 
policy interventions are modeled as ad valorem taxes, tariffs and subsidies, or 
quantitative restrictions in the case of textile and apparel trade.  International 
trade is linked through Armington substitution among goods differentiated by 
country of origin.  Therefore, in markets for traded commodities, buyers 
differentiate between domestically produced products and imported products 
with the same name.  Product differentiation between imports by region of 
origin allows for two-way trade across regions in each tradable product.  
Investment in each region is financed from a global pool of savings. Each 
region contributes a fixed proportion of its income to the savings pool.  Two 
alternative ways can be used to allocate the savings pool.  The first way is 
where each region‘s share increases by the proportion in which aggregate 
pool increases.  The second way is where the investment allocation is done 
according to the relative rates of return.  Regions, which experience increases 
in their rate of return relative to the global average, will receive increased 
shares of the investment budget, whereas regions experiencing reductions in 
their rate of return relative to the global average will receive reduced shares.  
In simplified words, GTAP model has many general features which 
include product differentiation by country of origin, explicit recognition of 
savings by regional economies, a capital goods producing sector in each 
region to service investment, international mobility of capital, multiple 
trading regions, multiple goods and primary factors, empirically based 
differences in production technology and consumer preferences across 
regions, and explicit recognition of a global transport sector.  There is clear 
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distinction between those factors that are perfectly mobile and those that are 
sluggish in adjusting.  In the case of the mobile factors, they earn the same 
market return regardless of the use location.  As for the sluggish factors, 
returns in equilibrium may be different across sectors.  It is also featured by 
many policy variables, including taxes and subsidies on commodities as well 
as on primary factors, making the model more attractive to policy analysts.  
In each region both factor and commodity markets are assumed to be 
perfectly competitive. 
The GTAP framework described above relies on country and regional 
input-output tables as its database.  More specifically, the GTAP database 
comprises: input-output data for each region, bilateral trade data derived 
from United Nations trade statistics; and support and protection data derived 
from a number of sources.  For this paper, we used version 7 of the GTAP 
database, covering 113 countries/regions and 57 sectors, with a base year of 
2004.  All the trade flows for the 57 commodity categories are distinguished 
by their countries/regions of origin and destination, and on the basis of agents 
such as intermediate demand, final demand by private households, 
government and investment.  It provides a method for allowing for varying 
import intensities by different economic agents within a country/region.  In 
the present simulation, 113 countries/regions in GTAP database are 
aggregated into 4 countries/regions.  Details of regional aggregation are 
presented in table A3 in Appendix. 
 
5.3. Simulation Scenarios 
 
 To examine the potential trade flows as result of tariff removal by India 
and Korea on imports from each other in SMART Model, 100% tariff 
cut by each country has been simulated. Each country is being 
considered separately.  
 
 To examine the potential trade flows as result of tariff removal by India 
and Korea on imports from each other in GTAP Model, 100% tariff cut 
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simultaneously by India and Korea on imports from each other has 
been simulated.  These simulations are undertaken on the basis of 
standard book closures.  The outcomes of the simulations are reported 
in terms of its effect on welfare for overall assessment.  
 
 
6. SIMULATION OUTCOMES 
 
6.1. SMART Model Results 
 
One of the main justifications of liberalization is to reduce the price paid 
by consumers, increasing thus their purchasing power.  So, our main 
objective is to analyze as accurately as possible consumers‘ potential gain.  
Further, product-specific tariff revenues and trade effects has also been 
estimated.  We choose to simulate the impact of a complete dismantlement of 
tariffs in order to clearly expose the effects of trade liberalization on all 
products.  This is therefore an ―extreme scenario‖ which aims at delineating 
the general trends of the impact of liberalization of both economies under the 
CEPA.  
India‘s trade gains as result of South Korea‘s tariff reduction indicate an 
increase about US$ 5.7 billion.  The first 25 tariff lines on the basis of total 
trade effects in descending order are presented in the table 1.   The maximum 
gain of India  in HS product at 6 digit level are light oils and preparations 
(271011), maize (corn), other than seed (100590), Cashew nuts, shelled 
(80132), smoking tobacco, whether or not containing tobacco substitutes in 
any proportion (240310), machinery for liquefying air/other gases, 
whether/not electrically heated (841960) and tobacco partly or wholly 
stemmed or stripped (240120).  Approximately 6% is the trade diversion 
effect.  However, there is significant trade diversion in some of these tariff 
lines from United States, Brazil, Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Spain, Australia, 
Japan, Israel, and Germany.  For instance, HS 6 digit tariff line 100590, 
240120, 720230, 230400, 130219, and 840734 indicate trade diversion around 
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Table 1 India’s Export as Result of Korea’s Tariff Reduction 
HS  
Code 
Trade  
Total  
Effect   
($‘000)-TTE 
Trade 
Diversion 
Effect 
($ ‘000)-TDE 
Trade 
Creation 
Effect  
($ ‘000) 
TDE as a 
% of TTE 
Most 
Affected 
Country 
Total 6,059, 427 –377,453 5,681,972.57 6.22 - 
271011 5,454,725.81 113,446.89 5,341,278.93 2.08 - 
100590 233,146.29 157,526.35 75,619.94 67.57 United States 
80132 66,152.40 42.548 66,109.85 0.06 - 
240310 57,749.69 470.091 57,279.60 0.81 - 
841960 22,816.08 150.844 22,665.24 0.66 - 
240120 21,780.11 6,556.66 15,223.45 30.10 Brazil 
520523 10,370.11 3,163.85 7,206.26 30.51 Vietnam 
271119 8,222.29 403.887 7,818.41 4.91 - 
720230 6,722.67 3,235.41 3,487.26 48.13 China 
230400 6,448.61 3,597.25 2,851.36 55.78 Brazil 
130219 5,676.28 3,213.47 2,462.80 56.61 China 
711299 4,978.13 2,265.84 2,712.29 45.52 Indonesia 
330190 4,275.86 2,155.56 2,120.30 50.41 Spain 
840734 3,786.74 2,474.12 1,312.62 65.34 Australia 
151530 3,548.43 100.623 3,447.80 2.84 - 
270730 3,300.97 2,063.28 1,237.70 62.51 Japan 
520524 3,142.35 1,963.23 1,179.12 62.48 China 
294190 3,014.22 1,840.34 1,173.88 61.06 China 
710239 2,899.93 594.769 2,305.16 20.51 Israel 
520522 2,660.21 1,354.93 1,305.28 50.93 China 
293090 2,616.09 1,447.83 1,168.26 55.34 Japan 
320417 2,574.48 1,795.31 779.174 69.73 Japan 
840999 2,518.97 1,497.16 1,021.81 59.44 Germany 
847989 2,337.41 1,376.97 960.442 58.91 Japan 
730721 2,234.55 1,025.21 1,209.33 45.88 China 
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67.57%, 30.10%, 48.13%, 55.78%, 56.61% and 65.34% of total trade effects 
as result of South Korea‘s 100% tariff reduction on imports from India.  The 
25 HS products listed in table capture 98% of India‘s export gains.  The 
maximum gains are concentrated in high tariff products in South Korean 
market (table 2).   
Trade effects as result of India‘s tariff reduction predict an increase in 
South Korea‘s exports to India of US$ 1.823 billion and reported in table 3.  
The maximum gain of South Korea in HS product at 6 digit level are in 
vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (870332), line pipe 
of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having internal and external circular 
cross-sections (730512), petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals, etc (271019), other parts & accessories for the motor vehicles of 
87.01-87.05, excluding 8708.91/92/93/94/95 (870899), flat-rolled products of 
iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of >= 600mm, in coils, simply hot-rolled, 
not clad (720836), newsprint, in rolls or sheets (480100), unbalance motors, 
rubber buffers, coil springs, leaf springs, crank shaft drive and fuses (847989).  
Approximately 25% is the trade diversion effect in the increase in South 
Korean exports.  However, there is significant trade diversion some of these 
tariff lines from Germany, Singapore, Italy, Thailand, Sweden, China, 
Canada, Japan, Russian Federation and Mexico.  For instance, HS 6 digit 
tariff line 870899, 271019, 480100 reveal trade diversion around 93.79%, 
29.61%, 48.35% of total trade effects as result of India‘s 100% tariff 
reduction on imports from south Korea.  The 25 HS products listed in table 
capture 63% of South Korea‘s export gains.  The maximum gains are 
concentrated in high tariff products in Indian markets (table 4).   
SMART simulation results reveal positive consumer‘s surplus gains for 
India and South Korea.  The results are reported in table 5.  India‘s 
consumer‘s surplus will be increasing by US$ 317.8 million while 
consumer‘s surplus in South Korea will be increasing by US$ 452.8 million.  
The maximum consumer surplus gains for Indian consumers are concentrated 
in other vehicles, with compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine 
(870332), line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having internal 
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Table 2 India’s Export Interest in South Korea  
HS 
Tariff Line 
Code 
Exports Exports Export 
Before ($ ‘000) After ($ ‘000) Change ($ ‘000) 
271011 3,889,482.85 9,344,208.66 5,454,725.81 
100590 76,421.06 309,567.36 233,146.29 
80132 4,801.67 70,954.06 66,152.40 
240310 988.385 58,738.07 57,749.69 
841960 1,394.70 24,210.78 22,816.08 
240120 30,559.07 52,339.18 21,780.11 
520523 98,466.96 108,837.07 10,370.11 
271119 5,749.70 13,971.99 8,222.29 
720230 56,794.98 63,517.65 6,722.67 
230400 173,449.80 179,898.40 6,448.61 
130219 3,468.20 9,144.47 5,676.28 
711299 45,211.94 50,190.07 4,978.13 
330190 6,328.73 10,604.59 4,275.86 
840734 23,870.57 27,657.31 3,786.74 
151530 8,281.55 11,829.97 3,548.43 
270730 49,453.47 52,754.44 3,300.97 
520524 27,270.93 30,413.28 3,142.35 
294190 29,961.58 32,975.80 3,014.22 
710239 40,761.73 43,661.66 2,899.93 
520522 19,541.08 22,201.29 2,660.21 
293090 19,457.35 22,073.44 2,616.09 
320417 18,119.11 20,693.60 2,574.48 
840999 28,563.82 31,082.79 2,518.97 
847989 12,117.33 14,454.74 2,337.41 
730721 10,018.20 12,252.74 2,234.55 
Change in Export Revenue in First 25 Tariff Lines 5,937,699 
Total 6,059,427 
% of Total 97.99 
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Table 3 Korea’s Export as Result of India’s Tariff Reduction 
HS Code 
Trade  
Total  
Effect  
($ ‘000)-TTE 
Trade 
Diversion 
Effect  
($ ‘000)-TDE 
Trade 
Creation 
Effect  
($ ‘000) 
TDE as a  
% of TTE 
Most Affected 
Country 
Total 2,425,531.24 –601,783.31 1,823,747.94 24.8 - 
870332 515,438.81 59,570.06 455,868.75 11.56 Germany 
730512 299,170.94 428.063 298,742.87 0.14 - 
271019 130,341.39 38,588.73 91,752.66 29.61 Singapore 
870899 65,948.20 61,850.74 4,097.47 93.79 
Italy, Japan, 
Thailand, 
Sweden 
720836 62,182.11 8,253.15 53,928.96 13.27 China 
480100 39,111.88 18,910.46 20,201.42 48.35 Canada 
350691 34,708.20 427.037 34,281.17 1.23 - 
847989 32,363.73 13,446.97 18,916.76 41.55 Japan 
841810 27,735.07 681.154 27,053.92 2.46 - 
870829 26,595.55 6,290.91 20,304.63 23.65 Japan 
890120 25,344.31 1,914.02 23,430.29 7.55 - 
720916 23,829.09 1,915.32 21,913.77 8.04 - 
852871 23,622.17 6,721.92 16,900.24 28.46 China 
410792 22,602.86 321.136 22,281.73 1.42 - 
730890 22,375.29 8,149.46 14,225.84 36.42 China 
840490 21,798.21 3,719.29 18,078.92 17.06 
Russian 
Federation 
870830 19,466.73 2,767.51 16,699.22 14.22 Japan 
841989 19,312.81 2,618.01 16,694.80 13.56 China 
390410 18,512.62 7,601.31 10,911.31 41.06 Japan 
840820 18,029.02 968.298 17,060.73 5.37 - 
890190 16,732.30 9,696.90 7,035.40 57.95 
Russian 
Federation 
400219 16,644.42 5,491.64 11,152.78 32.99 Mexico 
846299 14,849.77 2,766.18 12,083.59 18.63 Japan 
870410 14,836.65 69.777 14,766.87 0.47 - 
870894 14,381.49 3,701.12 10,680.36 25.74 Japan 
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Table 4 Export Interest of Korea, Republic in India 
Tariff 
Line 
Code 
Exports Exports Export 
Before ($ ‘000) After ($ ‘000) 
Change in Export  
Revenue ($ ‘000) 
870332 45,949.81 561,388.62 515,438.81 
730512 55,084.72 354,255.66 299,170.94 
271019 768,983.24 899,324.62 130,341.39 
870899 1,130,916.84 1,196,865.05 65,948.20 
720836 208,208.08 270,390.20 62,182.11 
480100 172,364.31 211,476.18 39,111.88 
350691 3,341.79 38,050.00 34,708.20 
847989 150,419.62 182,783.35 32,363.73 
841810 7,455.36 35,190.43 27,735.07 
870829 57,483.42 84,078.97 26,595.55 
890120 430,408.38 455,752.69 25,344.31 
720916 47,223.26 71,052.35 23,829.09 
852871 61,196.55 84,818.72 23,622.17 
410792 3,988.96 26,591.82 22,602.86 
730890 67,326.35 89,701.64 22,375.29 
840490 88,626.90 110,425.11 21,798.21 
870830 25,774.75 45,241.48 19,466.73 
841989 28,084.90 47,397.71 19,312.81 
390410 96,772.87 115,285.49 18,512.62 
840820 9,007.07 27,036.10 18,029.02 
890190 133,187.57 149,919.87 16,732.30 
400219 119,873.63 136,518.05 16,644.42 
846299 32,938.51 47,788.29 14,849.77 
870410 547.512 15,384.16 14,836.65 
870894 39,549.62 53,931.10 14,381.49 
Change in Revenue in First 25 Tariff Lines 1,525,934 
Total 2,422,074 
% of Total 63.00% 
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Table 5 Consumer Surplus Gains as Result of Tariff Reduction 
Consumer Surplus Gains for India Consumer Surplus Gains for South Korea 
HS Code Welfare ($ ‘000) HS Code Welfare ($ ‘000) 
Total 317,797.31 Total 452,846.66 
870332 231,360.03 100590 306,820.15 
730512 14,873.12 271011 110,513.89 
271019 3,434.61 240310 17,246.47 
350691 2,677.28 130219 4,268.94 
720836 1,986.85 240120 2,248.44 
480100 1,779.55 80132 2,072.00 
870829 1,758.54 841960 1,488.09 
240220 1,640.92 330190 981.855 
841810 1,621.44 210690 415.129 
852871 1,417.80 271119 383.166 
870830 1,397.58 520523 361.16 
410792 1,346.89 200819 276.037 
847989 1,310.01 160420 214.918 
840820 1,300.60 720230 154.408 
730890 1,256.66 151530 147.976 
890120 1,203.71 40690 142.303 
841989 1,165.97 850231 113.872 
870410 985.556 350110 113.201 
870840 961.63 170211 111.694 
840490 948.675 40410 102.748 
730900 940.416 840734 100.552 
210390 923.399 711299 98.325 
730830 867.095 30379 94.807 
870894 857.005 870332 94.462 
846299 807.998 730721 90.412 
 
India-Korea CEPA: An Assessment 75 
Table 6 Revenue Loss as Result of Tariff Reduction 
India South Korea 
HS Code 
Revenue Effect 
($ ‘000) 
HS Code 
Revenue Effect 
($ ‘000) 
Total –768,368.17 Total –1,232,610.56 
870899 –119,271.94 100590 –1,002,854.49 
870332 –105,519.86 271011 –106,744.80 
890120 –43,232.24 130219 –12,275.49 
271019 –33,200.18 520523 –8,130.47 
480100 –19,122.65 240120 –7,198.85 
890190 –14,288.31 330190 –5,849.59 
847989 –13,084.01 230400 –3,186.85 
400219 –12,536.53 720230 –3,001.52 
720836 –10,823.06 230690 –2,532.52 
852990 –9,025.65 520524 –2,338.73 
720917 –8,459.45 870423 –2,213.98 
390410 –8,349.88 840734 –2,107.58 
730890 –7,517.97 711299 –1,819.98 
840490 –7,387.63 210690 –1,799.88 
852871 –6,791.85 294190 –1,696.25 
820730 –6,645.46 520522 –1,671.68 
870829 –6,377.42 520526 –1,632.71 
847990 –5,907.22 320417 –1,593.15 
842952 –5,808.82 270730 –1,545.50 
730512 –5,543.15 293090 –1,305.08 
730791 –5,469.72 840999 –1,188.51 
310530 –4,735.28 350110 –1,177.37 
870894 –4,325.07 870120 –1,148.89 
720837 –4,303.41 200819 –1,143.63 
841430 –4,211.79 847989 –1,113.23 
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and external circular cross-sections (730512), petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from bituminous minerals, etc (271019) while South Korean will be 
gaining consumer surplus in maize (corn), other than seed (100590) and light 
oils and preparations (271011).  
SMART simulation results also reveal that India‘s revenue loss will be 
US$ –768.4 million while South Korea may lose revenue about US$ –
1,232.6 million in case of perfect tariff liberalization (table 6).  Given the 
development needs, India must consider revenue loss and in order to tamper 
the losses in budget revenues, India should seek to diversify its tax base and 
develop alternative less distortionary revenue generating strategy.  India will 
be losing maximum revenue in the imports of other parts & accessories for 
the motor vehicles of 87.01-87.05, excluding 8708.91/92/93/94/95 (870899) 
and vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (870332) while 
South Korea might be losing maximum tariff revenue in the imports of maize 
(corn), other than seed (100590) and light petroleum oils and preparations 
(271011). 
 
6.2. GTAP Model Results 
 
GTAP analysis has been used to examine the overall assessment in terms 
of welfare. The results for welfare effects are reported in table 7.  In GTAP, 
welfare effects are measured using the equivalent variations (EV) (Ahmed, 
2009).  There are positive welfare gains for South Korea (US$ 422.8 million) 
while India is going to have a welfare loss equal to US$ –113.4 million.  In 
this scenario, net global welfare decreases by US$ –319 million.  Terms of 
trade improves significantly for South Korea.  India‘s large welfare loss may 
be due to ‗allocative inefficiency‘.  Welfare loss can also be explained by the 
fact that India is likely to face a large negative trade diversion effect out of 
this FTA which will offset the positive trade creation effect.  
Results from simulation models are sometimes highly dependent on 
parameter values such as substitution elasticities.  In GTAP, the values of key 
economic parameters in the disaggregated database are derived from a survey 
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Table 7 Welfare and its Components (US$ Millions) 
Country 
Groups 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Effects 
Change in 
Terms of Trade 
Change in 
Capital 
Stock 
Total 
India –309.2 191.6 4.2 –113.4 
South Korea 14.6 518.8 –110.6 422.8 
DevelCount 13.7 –311 47.2 –250.1 
RestofWorld –32.1 –405.5 59.4 –378.3 
Total –313 –6.1 0.1 –319 
 
Table 8 Systematic Sensitivity Analysis  
Welfare Changes (US$ Millions) 
Country 
Groups 
ESUBD (+/– 50% Shock) ESBVA (+/– 50% Shock) 
Default Mean SD 95 % C.I. Default Mean SD 95 % C.I. 
India –113.4 –110.2 139.4 –737.4 516.9 –113.4 –113.6 3.9 –1,167.1 245.3 
South Korea 422.8 445.6 27.7 321.1 570.1 422.8 422.5 7.6 321.4 570.9 
Devel Count –250.1 –256.6 58.1 –518.2 5.0 –250.1 –248.9 6.1 –507.4 1.9 
Rest of  
World 
–373.0 –380.2 42.1 –569.6 –190.7 –373.0 –373.8 5.4 –610.9 –172.8 
 
of econometric work.  Such estimates are most appropriately viewed as 
random.  To address this issues, we conduct formal systematic sensitivity 
analysis (SSA) using the multivariate order three Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) 
procedure.  This analysis is an attempt to show how uncertain we are about 
modeling results given that there is some uncertainty over model inputs.  It is 
a way of testing the robustness of the model results to these inputs. 
The SSA results summarize the estimates of the mean ( ˆEV ) and standard 
deviation ( ˆEV ) of welfare results (E.V.) for South Korea and India.  The 
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95% confidence intervals are constructed using Chebysshev‘s Inequality 
( ˆ ˆ4.5EV EV  , ˆ ˆ4.5EV EV  ).  The SSA results are reported in table 8.  The 
SSA results for (+/–) 50% shock around the default value of ESUBD and 
ESUBVA indicate that welfare for India may have mixed direction 
depending on parameter values, with greater probability of negative side.  
Further, SSA analysis indicates that welfare gains for South Korea will 
remain positive irrespective of parameter values.  Hence, the welfare gains 
for South Korea are more stable compared to India in case of free trade in 
Goods.  
 
 
7. UNTAPPED INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
 
As discussed above, India has limited scope in trade in goods.  In this 
scenario, India may gain in terms of South Korean investment inflows in 
India as result of this CEPA.  However, it is difficult to examine the effect of 
India-Korea CEPA on FDI inflows since CEPA became effective recently.  It 
is also not possible to predict investment outcome using SMART and GTAP 
model as predicted in case of trade in goods.  Hence, the best way to gauge 
the probable effect of CEPA is to examine the India‘s experience with FDI 
with other bilateral FTAs or CEPA.  So far India signed free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with Sri Lanka, SAFTA and recently with ASEAN.  At 
the same time it concluded the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (CECA) with Singapore and recently with South Korea.  Hence, 
an attempt has been made to assess the impact of India-Korea CEPA on FDI 
inflows using approach of case study based method. 
 
7.1. India-Sri Lanka FTA and FDI 
 
The FTA between India and Sri Lanka came into full existence from 1st 
March 2000.  This FTA was the first among the new age preferential trade 
arrangements that India signed.  This is reflected in significant flows of 
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investments from India to Sri Lanka, including export-oriented investments 
by Indian companies in Sri Lanka.  The increase of Indian investments to Sri 
Lanka has been a more visible indirect benefit of the India-Sri Lanka FTA.  
Nearly a 100 Indian companies are currently operating in Sri Lanka.  A 
typical example is an investment made by an Indian tyres company, CEAT to 
set up a large export-oriented tyres plant in Sri Lanka to cater to its growing 
markets in Pakistan, Middle East and other countries taking advantage of 
abundant supply of natural rubber in the country (Kumar, 2007).  India is 
now the country‘s second largest investor; investing US$ 126 million in 
2008, second only to Malaysia (which invested US$ 150 million in 
2008).  This is a contribution of 14% of total FDI inflows to Sri Lanka, and is 
a marked increase from the previous investment levels during 1978-1995 
which amounted to just 1.2% of total investments.  An example of a recent 
Indian investment success story has been the entry of Piramal Glass 
(acquisition of Ceylon Glass Company), which is now not only catering to 
the Sri Lankan market but has also begun exporting nearly 70% of their 
output to the Indian market.  Indian Oil Corporation, Taj Hotels, Apollo 
Hospitals, L & T, Ambujas, Tatas and Ashok Leyland are among the 
prominent Indian companies operating in Sri Lanka.  Power Grid 
Corporation of India Ltd, National Thermal Power Corporation, Lanka India 
Oil Corporation (Lanka IOC), Cairn Lanka Pvt Ltd, Lanka Ashok Leyland, 
and Mphasis are now devising plans making massive investments to expand 
their businesses in the island.  At the same time,  Sri Lankan investments in 
India too have increased, and include areas such as garments, confectionaries, 
hotels and furniture, with some of Sri Lanka‘s top blue chip companies 
opening up ventures there (e.g., Brandix, MAS, Aitken Spence, John Keells) 
(Jayaratne, Tuesday, March 9, 2010). 
 
7.2. SAFTA and FDI 
 
SAFTA came into effect on 1 January 2006. The potential effect of 
SAFTA on FDI is also highlighted in the ADB/UNCTAD (2008) study 
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which indicates that lower intra-regional tariffs will attract FDI from outside 
the region.  It estimates that 30% of the rise in inward FDI may be due to the 
lowering of intra-regional tariffs.  This indicates that SAFTA may encourage 
FDI inflows into individual member countries and consequently into the 
region as a whole.  SAFTA offers opportunities for increased intra-regional 
investment, either as direct investment by partner country companies or in 
joint ventures with local entrepreneurs of the host country.  FDI statistics also 
reveal increasing FDI flows within SAFTA region.  Sri Lanka has emerged 
as the third major source of FDI of Bangladesh.  Sri Lanka is behind only to 
the US and South Korea in relation to the foreign direct investment in 
Bangladesh (Colombo Page, 2010).  India is the top investor in Nepal, 
followed by the US and China. India contributes about 38% of total foreign 
investment in Nepal (Sahoo, Tuesday, Nov. 16, 2010). 
There are vast differences in terms of the technological sophistication of 
these economies.  The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-11 reports that 
India leads the group and is ranked 51st followed by Sri Lanka (62), 
Bangladesh (107), Pakistan (123), and Nepal (130).  Dissimilarities increase 
in the category of ―efficiency enhancing factors‖.  These dissimilarities 
create strong possibilities for domestic market-seeking as well as efficiency-
seeking FDI.  Similar argument was put forward by Aggrawal (2008).  
Mukherjee (2005) shows that revealed comparative advantage of South 
Asian countries in services differ across sectors.  There are thus enormous 
openings for vertical FDI by firms both from within the partner countries and 
from outside the RTA.  As a whole, the available literature indicate positive 
outcome of SAFTA. 
 
7.3. India-Singapore CECA and FDI 
 
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(CECA) was signed in 2005.  FDI from Singapore to India has taken place in 
various sectors of the country like transportation industries, fuel and 
electrical equipments.  Many Singapore firms such as Singtel, Temasek 
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Holdings, and Singapore Technologies Telemedia have made investments in 
the country.  Following the signing of CECA, number of Indian companies 
has reportedly set up bases in Singapore to expand into East Asian region.  
The emerging pattern of industrial restructuring is best illustrated by the 
acquisition of NatSteel, Singapore by Tata Steel of India recently and the 
emerging pattern of supply chain integration.  This way the synergy or the 
locational advantages of India emanating from the iron ore deposits will be 
available to the NatSteel plants and their specialization for some special 
steels to Tata Steel will be exploited for mutual advantage.  Presently, the 
total FDI inflows from Singapore to India between 1991 and 2009 
(November) amounts to $9.7 billion.  The country ranks second in FDI 
inflows to India.  The key sectors attracting FDI inflows include — service, 
petroleum and natural gas, computer software and hardware, telecom and 
mining (The Financial Express, June 11, 2010).  
 
7.4. India-Korea CEPA and FDI 
 
South Korean companies are already having major investments in India 
with an estimated investment of $2.7 billion and presence of over 50 
companies here.  The CEPA will encourage more Korean investments in 
consumer goods and physical infrastructure and construction sectors (Jose, 
2010).  Following the signing of the India-Korea CEPA, Korea should 
increase direct investments in India.  India can be used as a ―beachhead for 
Korea‖ to facilitate its exports to Europe, Africa and the Middle East.  India 
is suffering from a huge trade deficit so it is in dire need of an export-
oriented manufacturing base.  This is a win-win situation for both Korea and 
India, if Korea makes direct investments aimed at using India‘s cheap but 
excellent manpower (Baburajan, 2009). 
Recently, India has liberalized and consolidated FDI policy for boosting 
FDI inflows.  FDI is freely permitted in almost all sectors except a handful of 
industry sectors in which no FDI or limited FDI is permitted — these tend to 
be ―sensitive‖ sectors.  In the limited number of sectors/activities requiring 
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prior government approval, proposals for FDI are considered by the 
government on the recommendation of the Foreign Investment Promotion 
Board (FIPB) in a time bound and transparent manner.  Under the Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) Scheme, investments can be made by non-residents 
through two routes; the Automatic Route and the Government Route.  Under 
the Automatic Route, the foreign investor or the Indian company does not 
require any approval from the Reserve Bank or Government of India for the 
investment.  Under the Government Route, prior approval of the Government 
of India, Ministry of Finance, and Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
(FIPB) is required.  In sectors which are not reflected in the prohibited list or 
in the Sector-specific policy, FDI is permitted up to 100% through the 
automatic route. 
The main sectors attracting FDI from South Korea are transportation 
industry accounting for over 1/3rd of the share, fuels (power & oil refinery), 
electrical equipment (computer software & electronics), chemicals (other 
than fertilizer) and commercial, office & household equipments.  There are 
large numbers of untapped opportunities for South Korean firms in India. 
Few Sectors are discussed below: 
 
Oil & Gas Industry: India‘s domestic demand for oil and gas is on the 
rise and country always has excess demand scenario.  India is also emerging 
as the global hub for oil refining with capital costs lower by 25% to 50% 
over other Asian countries.  In this sector, the government of India has been 
taking many progressive measures to create a conducive policy and 
regulatory framework for attracting investments.  According to the 
Investment Commission of India, the total opportunity in the oil and gas 
sector is expected to reach US$ 35 billion to US$ 40 billion by 2012 (IBEF, 
2010). 
Infrastructure Sector: Infrastructure investment in India is set to grow 
dramatically.  According to investment banking company Goldman Sachs, 
India‘s infrastructure sector will require US$ 1.7 trillion investment in the 
next 10-years in ports, airports, railroads, roads, etc (IBEF, 2010).  In a 
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recent development, Korea Land Corporation (KLC), an agency of the South 
Korea Government, signed a memorandum of association (MOA), to set up 
an industrial park and technology zone in Gujarat Vittal Innovation City 
(GVIC), a multi-product special economic zone (SEZ) being jointly 
developed by Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) and 
GVIC (Baburajan, 2009).  
Tourism & Hospitality Sector: As per the Travel and Tourism 
Competitiveness Report 2009 by the World Economic Forum, India is ranked 
11th in the Asia Pacific region, 14th best tourist destination for its natural 
resources and 24th for its cultural resources, with many World Heritage sites, 
both natural and cultural, rich fauna, and strong creative industries in the 
country.  The demand for travel and tourism in India is expected to grow by 
8.2% between 2010 and 2019 and will place India at the third position in the 
world (Tourism Satellite Accounting (TSA), 2009).  The report forecasts 
India to get capital investment worth US$ 94.5 billion in the travel and 
tourism sector in 2019 (IBEF, 2010).  
Healthcare Industry: In recent years, the healthcare industry in the 
country, which comprises hospital and allied sectors, is projected to grow by 
23% per annum and expected to touch US$ 77 billion by 2012 from the 
current estimated size of US$ 35 billion (Yes Bank/ASSOCHAM report, 
2009).  As per FICCI-Ernst and Young report, India needs an investment of 
US$ 14.4 billion in the healthcare sector by 2025, to increase its bed density 
to at least two per thousand populations.  The fast growth in the Indian 
healthcare sector has created various pockets of opportunities for investors.  
Textiles Industry: A leading sector in the Indian economy, textiles 
contributes 14% to industrial production, 4% to the GDP and around 17% to 
the total export earnings.  It is, in fact, the largest foreign exchange earning 
sector in the country.  India has certain natural advantages which has 
propelled the growth of its textiles Industry.  The increase in the domestic 
market and exports has led to increased investment inflows into the sector.  
By 2012, investment in the textiles and clothing industry is estimated to 
touch US$ 38.14 billion (IBEF, 2010). 
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Automobile Sector: Automobiles have been kept outside the ambit of 
tariff elimination but there is continuous support and encouragement for FDI.  
The growth of the Indian middle class along with the growth of the economy 
over the past few years has attracted global auto majors to the Indian market.  
Moreover, India provides trained manpower at competitive costs making 
India a favoured global manufacturing hub.  The attractiveness of the Indian 
markets on one hand and the stagnation of the auto sector in markets such as 
Europe, US and Japan on the other have resulted in shifting of new capacities 
and flow of capital to the Indian automobile industry.  Korean car giant 
Hyundai are increasingly banking on their Indian operations to add weight to 
their businesses, even as numbers stay uncertain in developed markets due to 
economic recession and slowdown.  Hence, there is still huge untapped 
potential for Investment. 
Auto Components: According to the Investment Commission of India, 
India is among the most competitive manufacturers of auto components in 
the world.  India is also becoming a global hub for research and development 
(R&D).  Companies like Daimler Chrysler, Bosch, Suzuki and Johnson 
Controls have set up development centres in India.  Many international auto-
component majors including Delphi, Visteon, Bosch and Meritor have set up 
operations in India.  Auto manufacturers including GM, Ford, Toyota, etc. as 
well as auto component manufacturers have set up International Purchasing 
Offices (IPOs) in India to source for their global operations (VGP, 2008).  
The government has taken many initiatives to promote foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the industry such as automatic approval for foreign 
equity investment up to 100% of manufacture of automobiles and 
components is permitted, the automobile industry is delicensed and import of 
components is freely allowed.  
Aviation Industry: The Indian aviation industry is one of the fastest-
growing aviation industries in the world with private airlines accounting for 
more than 75% of the sector of the domestic aviation market.  FDI up to 
100% is allowed under the automatic route for Greenfield projects in this 
sector.  For existing projects, FDI up to 100% is allowed; while investment 
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up to 74% under the automatic route and beyond 74% under the government 
route.  Investment opportunities of US$ 110 billion are being envisaged up to 
2020 with US$ 80 billion towards new aircraft and US$ 30 billion towards 
development of sectoral infrastructure, according to the Investment 
Commission of India (IBEF, 2010). 
In addition to the above sectors, South Korean firm may also explore 
investment opportunities in financial services, power, telecommunications, 
banking, insurance, real estate sectors, food processing Industry and electronics.  
 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The present study reveals that India and South Korea will have positive 
effect on consumer‘s surplus as a result of this CEPA.  To this point, it is 
assumed that producers and exporters will pass the benefits of tariff 
reductions on to consumers.  If the benefits of tariff dismantlement are not 
passed on to consumers but are captured by the exporter or the importer, it is 
possible that there will be no increase in consumer welfare.  It is therefore 
crucial to ensure that consumer welfare is transmitted to consumers.  To this 
end, it is necessary that the competition policy shield consumers against 
possible abuse of potential dominant positions or against collusion from large 
importers.  Competition policy capacities and the judicial system supporting 
it should therefore be strengthened to ensure that the CEPA delivers its 
potential benefits.  The present study also indicates that India and South 
Korea will gain in terms of trade by US$ 5.7 billion and US$ 1.82 billion 
respectively. 
Despite positive trade and consumer surplus gains, the overall assessment 
of the FTA part of IKCEPA may cause welfare loss for India as indicated by 
CGE Analysis.  Welfare loss can also be explained by the fact that India is 
likely face a large negative trade diversion effect out of this FTA which will 
offset the positive trade creation effect.  However, CGE analysis reveals 
positive welfare gains for South Korea.  The sensitivity analysis indicates 
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that the results are more stable for South Korea compared to India in case of 
free trade in Goods.   Like other FTAs/CEPA, this CEPA is also expected to 
cause revenue loss for both partners.  In order to tamper the losses in budget 
revenues, India should seek to diversify their tax base and develop alternative 
less distortionary revenue generating strategy.  It is more critical issue for 
India given her development requirements. 
In the light of this study, it may be concluded that India-Korea CEPA may 
not be delivering static gains in terms of trade.  However, dynamic gains for 
India may be huge in terms of Korean FDI inflows, trade in services and 
technology transfer.  The successful implementation of CEPA and proactive 
policy coordination will encourage collaboration between small and medium 
size Korean companies to synergize with Indian small and medium 
enterprises in the various areas of economy.  Both side need to focus on 
removal of non-tariff barriers in goods trade, investment, services and 
technology transfers, otherwise predicted gains may not be materialized 
despite tariff removal.  
At the end, there is need to implement CEPA at faster rate.  For instance, 
the reduction in tariffs on 85% of Korean exports over the next eight to 10 
years is slower and less comprehensive than the Korea-U.S. and the Korea-
EU free trade agreements, which will reduce or eliminate tariffs on 93% to 
99% of Korean products over the next five years.  CEPA has also been 
criticized for not addressing the financial sector. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A1. Tariff Reduction or Elimination under CEPA 
 
1. Except as otherwise provided in a Party‘s Schedule to this Annex, the 
following staging categories apply to the reduction or elimination of 
customs duties by each Party pursuant to Article 2.4.1: 
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i) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging category 
E-0 in a Party‘s Schedule shall be eliminated entirely and such goods 
shall be duty-free on the date this Agreement enters into force; 
ii) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging category 
E-5 in a Party‘s Schedule shall be removed in five equal annual stages 
beginning on the date this Agreement enters into force, and such goods 
shall be duty free,  effective January 1 of year four; 
iii) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging 
category E-8 in a Party‘s Schedule shall be removed in eight equal 
annual stages beginning on the date this Agreement enters into force, 
and such goods shall be duty free, effective January 1 of year seven; 
iv) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging 
category RED in a Party‘s Schedule shall be reduced to one to five 
percent from the base rate in eight equal annual stages beginning on the 
date this Agreement enters into force, and such goods shall remain at 
one to five percent, effective January 1 of year seven; 
v) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging category 
SEN in a Party‘s Schedule shall be reduced: 
- for India, by fifty percent of the base rate in ten equal annual stages 
beginning on the date this Agreement enters into force, and such 
goods shall remain at fifty percent of the base rate, effective January 1 
of year nine; and 
- for Korea, by fifty percent of the base rate in eight equal annual stages 
beginning on the date this Agreement enters into force, and such 
goods shall remain at fifty percent of the base rate, effective January 1 
of year seven; 
vi) duties on originating goods provided for in the items in staging 
category EXC. in a Party‘s Schedule are exempt from the obligation of 
tariff reduction or elimination. 
 
2. Tariff reduction or elimination pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be carried 
out in accordance with the following timetable: 
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Percentages of Annual Tariff Reduction for Korea 
Category 
Entry 
into 
Force 
Jan. 1 
Year 1 
Jan. 1 
Year 2 
Jan. 1 
Year 3 
Jan. 1 
Year 4 
Jan. 1 
Year 5 
Jan. 1 
Year 6 
Jan. 1 
Year 7 
E-0 100%        
E-5 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%    
E-8 12.5% 25% 37.5% 50% 62.5% 75% 87.5% 100% 
RED 
12.5% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
25% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
37.5% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
50% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
62.5% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s 
minus  
1-5%] 
75% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
87.5% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
100% of 
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
SEN. 6.3% 12.5% 18.8% 25% 31.3% 37.5% 43.8% 50% 
 
Percentages of Annual Tariff Reduction for India 
Cate- 
gory 
Entry 
into 
Force 
Jan. 1 
Year 1 
Jan. 1 
Year 2 
Jan. 1 
Year 3 
Jan. 1 
Year 4 
Jan. 1 
Year 5 
Jan. 1 
Year 6 
Jan. 1 
Year 7 
Jan. 1 
Year 8 
Jan. 1 
Year 9 
E-0 100%          
E-5 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%      
E-8 12.5% 25% 37.5% 50% 62.5% 75% 87.5% 100%   
RED 
12.5%  
of  
[Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
25%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
37.5%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
50%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
62.5%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
75%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
87.5%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s) 
minus  
1-5%] 
100%  
of 
 [Base 
Rate 
(in %s)  
minus  
1-5%] 
  
SEN. 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 
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3. The base rate of customs duty for determining the interim rate of 
customs duty for an item shall be the MFN customs duty rate applied on 
1 April 2006. 
 
4. For the purposes of this Annex and a Party‘s Schedule, year one means 
the subsequent year after this Agreement enters into force as provided in 
Article 15.7 (Entry into Force). 
 
5. For the purposes of this Annex and a Party‘s Schedule, beginning in 
year one, each annual stage of tariff reduction shall take effect on 
January 1 of the relevant year.  
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Table A1 Trade Indicators Statistics 
(Reporter-India, Partner-Korea, Rep.) 
Year 
Export 
Growth 
(%) 
Export 
Intensity 
Index 
Export 
Share 
(%) 
Import 
Growth 
(%) 
Import 
Share 
(%) 
Total 
Trade 
Growth 
(%) 
Total 
Trade, 
in 
Million 
US$ 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Trade 
Share 
(%) 
1991 47.5 0.66 1.3 –3.6 1.6 13.5 555.0 0.76 1.5 
1992 –18.6 0.57 1.0 30.6 1.8 9.2 606.0 0.78 1.4 
1993 17.3 0.56 1.1 –10.8 1.7 –1.7 595.8 0.70 1.4 
1994 20.9 0.54 1.2 90.0 2.7 63.3 972.7 0.92 2.0 
1995 41.5 0.55 1.3 3.3 2.1 14.2 1,111.2 0.74 1.7 
1996 27.8 0.63 1.6 16.6 2.3 20.6 1,339.9 0.84 2.0 
1997 –4.7 0.62 1.4 16.3 2.4 8.4 1,452.6 0.85 1.9 
1998 –27.6 0.70 1.0 33.3 3.1 13.2 1,644.1 1.15 2.2 
1999 24.9 0.63 1.2 0.6 2.7 5.7 1,738.0 0.94 2.1 
2000 5.3 0.47 1.1 –24.2 2.0 –16.8 1,445.9 0.63 1.6 
2001 119.8 1.04 2.2 56.6 2.6 76.6 2,553.6 1.05 2.4 
2002 –40.2 0.55 1.2 –7.9 2.4 –20.6 2,028.3 0.78 1.9 
2003 22.2 0.55 1.2 75.4 3.4 59.6 3,237.2 0.99 2.4 
2004 24.3 0.54 1.2 24.0 3.1 24.1 4,016.2 0.90 2.3 
2005 78.6 0.73 1.7 38.6 3.1 47.7 5,930.9 0.97 2.5 
2006 43.7 0.83 1.9 10.4 2.7 19.5 7,088.3 0.91 2.4 
2007 18.1 0.77 1.8 20.7 2.4 19.9 8,497.3 0.85 2.2 
2008 116.2 1.19 3.0 72.3 3.2 86.6 15,857.7 1.18 3.1 
Notes: Export growth is the percentage change in the value of exports relative to the previous 
year.  Export intensity index is the ratio of export share of a country/region to the share 
of world exports going to a partner.  An index of more than one indicates that trade 
flow between countries/regions is larger than expected given their importance in world 
trade.  Export share is the percentage of exports going to a partner to total exports of a 
country/region.  A higher share indicates a higher degree of integration between partner 
countries/regions.  Import growth is the percentage change in the value of imports 
relative to the previous year.  Import share is the percentage of imports from a partner 
to total imports of a country/region.  A higher share indicates a higher degree of 
integration between partner countries/regions.  Total trade growth is the percentage 
change in the value of total trade (exports plus imports) relative to the previous year.  
Total trade is the sum of the value of exports and imports.  Trade intensity index is the 
ratio of trade share of a country/region to the share of world trade with a partner.  An 
index of more than one indicates that trade flow between countries/regions is larger 
than expected given their importance in world trade.  Trade share is the percentage of 
trade with a partner to total trade of a country/region.  A higher share indicates a higher 
degree of integration between partner countries/regions. 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, Asia Regional Integration Center - Integration 
Indicators Database (http://aric.adb.org/indicators.php). 
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Table A2 Trade Indicators Statistics  
(Reporter- Korea, Rep, Partner- India) 
Year 
Export 
Growth 
(%) 
Export 
Intensity 
Index 
Export 
Share 
(%) 
Import 
Growth 
(%) 
Import 
Share 
(%) 
Total 
Trade 
Growth 
(%) 
Total  
Trade, in  
Million 
US$ 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index 
Trade 
Share 
(%) 
1991 7.71 1.19 0.65 71.19 0.59 32.72 954.00 1.10 0.62 
1992 –5.88 1.01 0.57 –1.49 0.58 –3.65 919.20 1.03 0.57 
1993 308.42 3.23 2.10 9.55 0.60 153.13 2,326.80 2.03 1.35 
1994 –35.66 1.77 1.14 11.70 0.57 –25.01 1,744.80 1.29 0.86 
1995 –3.00 1.23 0.86 36.55 0.59 10.25 1,923.60 1.05 0.72 
1996 4.58 1.15 0.85 22.26 0.65 11.92 2,152.80 1.01 0.75 
1997 –2.24 1.09 0.80 –4.06 0.65 –3.07 2,086.80 0.99 0.72 
1998 45.05 1.75 1.26 –35.13 0.65 9.09 2,276.40 1.39 1.01 
1999 –18.40 1.19 0.94 26.48 0.64 –6.43 2,130.00 1.06 0.81 
2000 –2.63 1.09 0.77 28.22 0.61 8.49 2,310.88 0.97 0.69 
2001 6.15 1.37 0.93 12.28 0.78 8.76 2,513.36 1.20 0.86 
2002 –1.68 1.19 0.85 12.96 0.82 4.76 2,633.05 1.09 0.84 
2003 106.12 1.89 1.47 –1.29 0.69 55.17 4,085.69 1.33 1.09 
2004 27.31 1.70 1.43 50.07 0.82 34.17 5,481.96 1.26 1.14 
2005 26.59 1.66 1.61 14.17 0.81 22.40 6,709.92 1.22 1.23 
2006 20.33 1.31 1.70 72.38 1.18 36.72 9,173.59 1.20 1.44 
2007 19.29 1.09 1.77 27.02 1.30 22.36 11,224.46 1.09 1.54 
2008 36.02 1.19 2.10 42.31 1.51 38.61 15,558.30 1.17 1.80 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, Asia Regional Integration Center - Integration 
Indicators Database (http://aric.adb.org/indicators.php). 
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 Table A3 GTAP Regional Aggregation 
No Code Description Comprising 
1 India India India 
2 South Korea South Korea Korea 
3 DevelCount Developed 
Countries 
Australia; New Zealand; Hong Kong; Japan; 
Taiwan; Singapore; Canada; United States of 
America; Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; 
France;  Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; 
Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; 
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom; 
Switzerland; Norway; Rest of EFTA; 
Bulgaria; Romania 
4 RestofWorld Rest of the 
World 
Rest of Oceania; China; Rest of East Asia; 
Cambodia; Indonesia; Lao People's 
Democratic Republ; Myanmar; Malaysia; 
Philippines; Thailand; Viet Nam; Rest of 
Southeast Asia; Bangladesh; Pakistan; Sri 
Lanka; Rest of South Asia; Mexico; Rest of 
North America; Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; 
Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Paraguay; Peru; 
Uruguay; Venezuela; Rest of South America; 
Costa Rica; Guatemala; Nicaragua; Panama; 
Rest of Central America; Caribbean; Albania; 
Belarus; Croatia; Russian Federation; 
Ukraine; Rest of Eastern Europe; Rest of 
Europe; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyztan; Rest of 
Former Soviet Union; Armenia; Azerbaijan; 
Georgia; Iran Islamic Republic of; Turkey; 
Rest of Western Asia; Egypt; Morocco; 
Tunisia; Rest of North Africa; Nigeria; 
Senegal; Rest of Western Africa; Central 
Africa; South Central Africa; Ethiopia; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; 
Mozambique; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe; Rest of Eastern Africa; 
Botswana; South Africa; Rest of South 
African Customs 
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